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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
JOHN M. CATE*
A review of the past year in Workmen's Compensation in Tennessee
must of necessity take into account any legislative change in the Com-
pensation Act itself' as well as trends disclosed through the decisions
of the courts. The modern development and growth of this new theory,
that of liability without fault, make pertinent the inquiry. Although a
development of one generation, the theory of Workmen's Compensation
is now almost universal in application. Under it, industry bears its
fair share of the cost of injuries to workers, without any reference to
fault or blame or negligence, where there is a reasonably apparent re-
lationship of the injury to the job. Its adoption was a revolt from the
disastrous results to the injured worker in an overwhelming majority
of industrial accident cases of a strict application of the common law
rules of contributory negligence, fellow servant's negligence and as-
sumption of risk.
Faced with more than a century of judicial precedent that one per-
son's liability to another was based on fault or negligence, the courts at
first tended to a strict construction of such enactments; but the modern
trend is to construe the compensation acts liberally to protect the
worker and his dependents. Tennessee courts long ago joined with the
majority of courts of other jurisdictions in adopting this rule of liberal
construction to effectuate the humane objects of such enactments, re-
solving in favor of the injured employee any reasonable doubt as to
whether the injury to such employee arose out of or in the course of
his employment. This approach is evident in several of the recent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court hereinafter referred to.
LEGISLATION
Before entering upon a review of Supreme Court cases involving a
construction of the Compensation Act, mention should be made of
Chapter 111, Public Acts of Tennessee for 1953, whereby the legislature
amended the Compensation Act by raising substantially the limits for
benefits of injury or death of an employee covered by the Act. Thus, it
is provided that the employer's total liability for medical and surgical
treatments, hospitalization and the like is raised to $1,500.00 from
$800.00;2 burial expenses to $350.00 from $250.00;3 maximum weekly
* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Cate & Cate, Nashville,
Tennessee.
1. Tenn. Acts 1919, c. 123, as amended, TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 6851-6901 (Wil-
liams 1934, Supp. 1952).




compensation to $28.00 from $25.00, with a minimum of $12.00 instead
of $10.00 per week,4 provided that, if the employee's average weekly
wages are less than $12.00, he shall receive the full amount of his
average weekly wages but in no event less than $10.00, formerly $8.00
per week;5 and permanent total disability or death benefits to a maxi-
mum of $8,500.00 from $7,500.00.6
By thus substantially increasing the benefits recoverable by injured
employees and dependents of deceased employees, the legislature no
doubt took cognizance of current economic conditions resulting in
greatly increased costs of living, which, under the theory of the com-
pensation acts, should be passed on to the industry or employment in
which the employee is injured or killed.
JuDIcIAL DECISIONS
It would seem that in the 34 years since the effective date of the
Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act 7 every question which might
conceivably arise thereunder would have been passed upon by the
courts. However, new questions of construction and application arise
continually; among those issues decided by the Supreme Court during
the past year were two questions of new impression.8
Included in the cases before the Court in the period covered by this
Survey are a number involving interesting questions, such as the pri-
mary responsibility of the compensation insurer for benefits to persons
entitled thereto; 9 the right of a wife to recover from her husband's
employer at common law for the loss of her husband's consortium as a
result of injuries suffered by him in the course of his employment; 10
traumatic or post-traumatic neurosis as being compensable; 1 casual
employment; 12 the'sufficiency of pleadings in the compensation suit;' 3
the notice requirements of the Act;14 what constitutes injury "arising
out of" employment;' 5 the liability of a principal contractor for injury
to an employee of a subcontractor or independent contractor; 6 the
statute of limitations as applied to compensable occupational diseases; 7
speculation and conjecture as to whether or not an injury to or death
4. Id. § 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. July 1, 1919.
8. Wood v. Dean, 254 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. 1953); Napier v. Martin, 250 S.W.2d
35 (Tenn. 1952).
9. Douglas v. Sharp, 249 S.W.2d 999 (Tenn. 1952).
10. Napier v. Martin, 250 S.W.2d 35 (Tenn. 1952).
11. Buck & Simmons Auto & Elec. Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 250 S.W.2d 39
(Tenn. 1952).
12. Harper v. Grady Counce & Son, 250 S.W.2d 371 (Tenn. 1952).
13. Ledford v. Miller Bros. Co., 253 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1952).
14. Edwards v. Harvey, 253 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn. 1952).
15. Jim Reed Chevrolet Co. v. Watson, 254 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1953).
16. Wood v. Dean, 254 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. 1953).
17. Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Wilkins, 254 S.W.2d 973 (Tenn. 1953).
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of an employee is one "arising out of" and "in the course" of his em-
ployment, and burden of proof in compensation cases; 18 aggravation of
pre-existing injury or disease as being compensable; 19 and the re-
opening of a court-approved settlement agreement on petition of an
employee for assessment of additional benefits.
20
Primary Responsibility of Insurer. The case of Douglas v. Sharp2'
was one wherein the lower court awarded compensation to the depen-
dents of a deceased worker and the employer and insurer appealed and
assigned error. The Supreme Court held that a sublease by a partner-
ship of its mining property to another was a mere management con-
tract and that the deceased worker continued to be an employee of the
partnership; the latter's insurer, which made no change in the policy
after notice of the sublease and continued to take into consideration
the deceased employee's wages in computing the premiums paid to it
on the policy, was liable for compensation benefits as provided by +he
Act.
It is clear in this State, said the Court, that an employee's action
under the Workmen's Compensation Act may be against the employer
and the insurer jointly, citing American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v.
Patrick.2 The contract which the insurance company makes in such
cases is not one of guaranty but is one which creates a primary re-
sponsibility and possesses characteristics and incidents which cause
its construction to be with special reference to the subject of the con-
tract.23 The Court referred to Code section 6899,24 which among other
things directs that the insurance company promptly pay benefits to the
persons entitled thereto and provides that "this obligation shall not be
affected by any default of the insured for the injury or by any default
in the giving of any notice required by such policy or otherwise."
Therefore, the Court held the insurer is directly responsible to the per-
son entitled to compensation.
Exclusiveness of Remedy. The question of the exclusiveness of the
compensation remedy was before the Court in the case of Napier v.
Martin.25 Mrs. Napier sued Martin and others to recover damages at
common law for loss of the service and consortium of her husband due
to injuries suffered by him while in the employ of the defendants, who
were paying him benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
18. Cunningham v. Hembree, 257 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1953).
19. Howell v. Charles H. Bacon Co., 98 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), aff'd,
197 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1952).
20. Wright v. Gerst Brewing Co., opinion by Prewitt, J., filed April 25, 1953.
21. 249 S.W.2d 999 (Tenn. 1952).
22. 157 Tenn. 618, 11 S.W.2d 872 (1928).
23. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Booth, 164 Tenn. 41, 45 S.W.2d
1075 (1932).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6899 (Williams 1934).
25. 250 S.W.2d 35 (Tenn. 1952). See the discussion of this case in the section
on Actions for Loss of Consortium in the Domestic Relations Article.
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To review a judgment of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer to the
complaint and dismissing the suit, plaintiff brought error. The Su-
preme Court held that the exclusive right to recover compensation
for such injuries was under the Compensation Act. Hence, plaintiff
could not maintain the common law action.
Conceding that the question presented was one of first impression
in the State, the Court held that no such right of action exists in
Tennessee under the common law or by statute, citing Hull v. Hull
Bros. Lumber Co.26 The plaintiff insisted that, since the passage of
Chapter 126, Acts of 1919, commonly known as the Married Woman's
Emancipation Act, she was entitled to maintain her suit in the same
manner as a husband is entitled to-maintain a suit for loss of services
where his wife is the injured party. In rejecting this argument, the
Court pointed out that the Workmen's Compensation Act contains ex-
press provisions for the wife, children and other dependents of an em-
ployee who dies as a result of injury received in a compensable acci-
dent, thereby clearly evidencing a legislative intent to bring the entire
family group of which the employee is the head within the purposes
and coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Therefore, the
wife could not maintain the action for common law negligence, and the
lower court was correct in dismissing her suit.
27
Traumatic or Post-traumatic Neurosis as Compensable. In the case
of Buck & Simmons Auto & Elec. Supply Co. v. Kesterson,28 on appeal
from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that
traumatic or post-traumatic neurosis caused by an accident is an in-
jury within the Compensation Act and, therefore, compensable.
The Court pointed out that Code section 6852 (d), as it appeared be-
fore the Amendments of 1947, provided that "'"[i]njury" and "per-
sonal injury" shall mean only injury... and shall not include a disease
in any form except as it shall naturally result from the injury.'" The
Amendment of 1947 provided: "' "Injury" and "personal injury" shall
mean any injury. .. and shall include certain occupational diseases.
* . .'" (emphasis by Court) 29 The claimant contended that by this
change in the Act a neurosis of the kind found to result from the in-
jury in this case is excluded because not specified in the amendment
enumerating occupational diseases covered. Rejecting this argument,
the Court said that the amendment, by inserting the word "any" in the
place of the world "only," broadened the coverage of the Act so as to
include the specified occupational diseases in addition to diseases re-
sulting from injuries arising out of and in the course of employment
rather than limiting compensable diseases to those specified. This hold-
26. 186 Tenn. 53, 208 S.W.2d 338 (1948).
27. For an interesting discussion of this case, see 22 TENN. L. REV. 976 (1953).
28. 250 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. 1952).
29. Id. at 40.
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ing is in line with a long line of cases wherein the Court has followed
the principle that a disease connected with the injury is compensable. 30
The Court expressly adopted the rule laid down in certain Indiana
cases31 that "[t]he fact that appellee was suffering from a mental or
nervous condition resulting from a physical injury, rather than from
the physical injury itself, cannot have the effect of relieving appellant
from liability. This Court is committed to the doctrine that a 'personal
injury,' as that term is used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, has
reference not merely to some break in some part of the body, or some
wound thereon or the like, but also to the consequence of disability
that results therefrom."32 Applying the rule to the instant case, the
Court said that the disease met the requirements of the Tennessee Act,
which must be construed liberally.
Casual Employment. What constitutes casual employment was the
question before the Court in the case of Harper v. Grady Counce &
Son.33 This was a proceeding by Richard Harper against the partner-
ship of Grady Counce & Son, operator of an automobile garage, for in-
juries sustained while plaintiff was employed as a plumber at a stipu-
lated price per hour to install a water pipe in the garage. From a dis-
missal of his suit, plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the
action of the lower court, holding that plaintiff was a casual employee
and that, therefore, defendant was not liable.
The Court found that the plumbing business was not part of the
business of the defendant or even incidental thereto. Therefore, the
hiring of plaintiff as a plumber to install the water pipe at the place of
business of the defendant made him a casual employee only.34 It was
insisted that, because the insurance carrier paid compensation insur-
ance to the plaintiff for many weeks, the defendent was estopped to
deny liability. Disposing of this contention, the Court said that no
estoppel arose or could arise under the facts of the case, for the plain-
tiff was not injured or prejudiced by the payments made to him by the
insurance company.
Pleading. Declaring that strict rules of pleading have no place in
compensation cases, the Court held in Ledford v. Miller Bros. Co. 35 that
the lower court imposed too technical and strict a requirement as to
30. Sears-Roebuck Co. v. Finney, 169 Tenn. 547, 89 S.W.2d 749 (1936); King
v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 155 Tenn. 491, 296 S.W. 3, 53 A.L.R. 1086 (1927);
Vester Gas Range & Mfg. Co. v. Leonard, 148 Tenn. 665, 257 S.W. 395 (1923).
31. Burton-Shields Co. v. Steele, 119 Ind. App. 216, 83 N.E.2d 623, 85 N.E.2d
263 (1949); Kingan & Co. v. Ossam, 75 Ind. App. 548, 121 N.E. 289 (1918).
32. 250 S.W.2d at 41.
33. 250 S.W.2d 371 (Tenn. 1952).
34. TENN. CoDE AN. § 6856(b) (Williams Supp. 1952); Dancy v. Abraham
Bros. Pkg. Co., 171 Tenn. 311, 102 S.W.2d 526 (1937); Gibbons v. Roller Estates,
Inc., 163 Tenn. 373, 43 S.W.2d 198 (1931); Murphy v. Gaylord, 160 Tenn. 660,
28 S.W.2d 348 (1930).
35. 253 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1952).
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the pleadings in excluding the testimony of petitioner's expert medical
witness. The circuit court had rendered judgment awarding compensa-
tion for a limited period, and petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court
held that the exclusion of expert medical testimony tending to show
that the fall sustained by petitioner would aggravate a pre-existing
diseased condition of her leg was error prejudicial to petitioner.
This case is of particular interest because of its full discussion of the
question of pleadings in workmen's compensation cases. Observxing
that the provisions of the Act 36 are rather meager as to the pleadings
required, the Court said that its consistent policy has been to get away
from technical proceedings in such cases and to view the matter lib-
erally from the standpoint of the employee. Nevertheless, said the
Court, "it is a fact that the pleadings must be sufficient to advise the
employer of the nature of the claim so that he can be prepared to meet
it."37
Notice to Employer. The notice provisions of the Compensation Act
were before the Court in the case of Edwards v. Harvey.38 This case
was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff did
not give the notice of his injuries required by Code section 6872.39 Con-
firming its oft-repeated finding that the Workmen's Compensation Act
is not to be construed strictly as in derogation of the common law, but
liberally in favor of the compensation claimant and in furtherance of
the sound public policy that dictated the legislation, the Supreme
Court held that, where the employee reported the accident to his fore-
man immediately after it occurred but did not give written notice to
his employer until several months later when the employee learned
that his back injury was the result of his fall, the employee sufficiently
complied with the requirement of notice. The case was remanded for
the assessment of benefits due him.
Injury "Arising out of" Employment. In the case of Jim Reed Chev-
rolet Co. v. Watson,40 the sole question was whether the employee's in-
jury "arose out of" his employment. The Supreme Court held that it
could be assumed that employees who remained in the plant of their
employer all night would have some type of weapon with which to
protect themselves and that, therefore, an injury received by the
claimant, Watson, in an altercation which resulted when another em-
ployee, Hendricks, accused him of stealing Hendrick's pistol arose out
of the injured employee's employment, even though the employer had
36. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6851 et seq. (Williams 1934, Supp. 1952).
37. 253 S.W.2d at 553; Phillips v. Diamond Coal Mining Co., 175 Tenn. 191,
133 S.W.2d 476 (1939).
38. 253 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn. 1952).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6872 (Williams 1934).
40. 254 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1953).
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not instructed Hendricks to possess a pistol in connection with his em-
ployment and did not know of the pistol.
In affirming the award, the Court applied the principle "that an in-
jury may be said to arise out of an employment when there is a
'causal connection between the conditions under which the work is
required to be performed and the resulting injury' and also 'when it is
something the risk of which may have been contemplated by a reason-
able person when entering the employment as incidental thereto.' "41
Liability to Employee of Independent Contractor or Subcontractor.
The liability of a principal contractor for benefits to the employee of a
subcontractor or independent contractor was considered by the Court in
the case of Wood v. Dean.42 This was a proceeding against a partner-
ship and its insurer. The circuit court entered judgment awarding com-
pensation, and there was an appeal to the Supreme Court. The de-
fendant partnership was engaged in buying, developing and selling real
estate. It acquired a vacant lot, taking title in the name of one of the
partners, who intended to retain the lot as his individual property. A
contractor who was not subject to the Compensation Act was en-
gaged by the partnership to grade the lot, and an employee of the con-
tractor was injured in the unloading of the contractor's bulldozer near
the lot. The Court held that the partnership was the "principal con-
tractor" and, therefore, liable under the Compensation Act.
The question thus decided was recognized by the Court as being one
of first impression in the State. Thus, said the Court:
"We are confronted with a question that has not heretofore been before
us in any compensation case, that is the liability of a partnership, dealing
with a member, for injuries to one who is a servant of a subcontractor of
such partnership, and possibly an independent contractor....
"A liberal construction of the Compensation Statute would bring the
transaction within its provisions." 43
Statute of Limitations: Occupational Disease. The case of Holeproof
Hosiery Co. v. Wilkins44 was a proceeding to obtain workmen's com-
pensation benefits for an injury to the claimant's wrist arising as a
consequence of an occupational disease. No question was raised as to
the disease being one compensable under the 1947 amendment of the
Workmen's Compensation Act,45 the sole defense in the case being the
statute of limitations provided in said amendment and carried into the
Code as section 6852 (d),46 which reads in part as follows: "The right
41. Id. at 734. Peters v. Salant & Salant, Inc., 168 Tenn. 272, 77 S.W.2d 452
(1935); Shockley v. Morristown Produce & Ice Co., 158 Tenn. 148, 11 S.W.2d 900
(1928); Hendrix v. Franklin State Bank, 154 Tenn. 287, 290 S.W. 30 (1926).
42. 254 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. 1953).
43. Id. at 753.
44. 254 S.W.2d 973 (Tenn. 1953).
45. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 139.
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6852 (d) (Williams Supp. 1952).
[ VOL. 61018
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
to compensation for occupational disease shall be forever barred unless
suit therefor is commenced within one year after the beginning of in-
capacity for work resulting from an occupational disease .... "
The Court held that the statute is not tolled as of the date of the com-
mencing of the disease, for that would be impossible to determine with
any degree of accuracy, but is tolled at the beginning of "incapacity
to work," as clearly provided in the amendment of 1947. Since it ap-
peared that the claimant ceased work because of the disease on Jan-
uary 28, 1950, and was paid benefits under the Compensation Act until
September 9, 1950, her suit instituted on May 2, 1951, being within one
year of the date of the last payment made to her, was clearly au-
thorized by the 1947 amendment 47 to section 6874 of the Code and was
not barred by the aforesaid section 6852 (d).
Burden of Proof. Discussing the question of the burden of proof in
compensation cases, the Supreme Court in the case of Cunningham v.
Hembree48 held that the evidence sustained a finding that the death of
the deceased was due to a cerebro-vascular accident and that a sun and
heat stroke was a contributing cause.
Commenting on the facts that this was another of the many border
line cases which the Court is required to pass upon and that the Court
is not privileged to indulge in speculation and conjecture as to whether.
the injury to or death of the employee is one "arising out of" and "in
the course" of his employment,49 the Court held that, where a prima
facie case is made out, the burden shifts to the employer to overthrow
such a prima facie case in order to defeat the claim.50 Said the Court:
"In a review of most of our decisions, as well as some from other juris-
dictions, we find what appears to be a general belief among some members
of the legal profession that in this class of cases what is meant by the
petitioner having the burden of proof is that the proof on his behalf must
be sufficiently strong that the determinative issues are not a matter of
speculation. This implies that the petitioner must establish such issues
to a degree of certainty. This is certainly an erroneous view since having
made out a prima facie case 'the burden shifts to the employer to produce
evidence to overthrow [such a prima facie case]'. Milstead v. Kaylor...
[186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 614]."51
Aggravation of Pre-Existing Injury or Disease. The case of Howell
v. Charles H. Bacon Co. 52 was an action by Mrs. Elsie Howell against
the Charles H. Bacon Company to recover death benefits under the
47. Id. § 6874.
48. 257 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1953).
49. Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610 (1948); R. W. Hartwell
Motor Co. v. Hickerson, 160 Tenn. 513, 26 S.W.2d 153 (1930); Home Ice Co. v.
Franzini, 161 Tenn. 395, 32 S.W.2d 1032 (1930).
50. Shockley v. Morristown Produce & Ice Co., 158 Tenn. 148, 11 S.W.2d 900
(1928).
51. 257 S.W.2d at 15.
52. 98 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1952).
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Workmen's Compensation Act. The United States district court, invok-
ing the "reasonable inference rule" of Tennessee,53 held that the medi-
cal testimony warranted the inference that constant pain, worry and
nervous tension resulting from the fracture of a heel bone in a fall
from a broken scaffold aggravated a pre-existing coronary sclerosis
and hastened the death of the employee from coronary thrombosis
some three months after the accident. Pointing out that in Tennessee
it is well settled that disability resulting from an untoward event, com-
monly referred to as an accident, which hastens the onset of or ag-
gravates a pre-existing disease, is compensable,5 4 the court concluded
that, where the stronger inference is that the deceased employee's in-
jury and its inseparable consequences of ceaseless pain, worry and
nervous tension aggravate a pre-existing coronary sclerosis and hasten
his death, the case is compensable.
Reopening Court-Approved Settlement. In the case of Wright v.
Gerst Brewing Co.,55 the Supreme Court had before it an action insti-
tuted under the authority of section 6877.56 Involved was an appeal
in error from a circuit court action dismissing a petition by the claim-
ant to have the court set aside a prior order approving a settlement
agreement entered into by the parties and to grant him a judgment for
additional benefits. Holding that, where the findings of fact by the
trial judge are supported by material evidence, the Supreme Court
will not disturb the judgment, the Court affirmed the action of the
lower court in dismissing the petition.
CONCLUSION
Thus, a review of the workmen's compensation field in Tennessee for
the past year leads to agreement that, "[a]lthough the basic theory
and principles of workmen's compensation are relatively simple, their
practical application involves a greater number and variety of im-
portant administrative details than any other comparable piece of
legislation. The actual operation of a workmen's compensation law, so
that it substantially fulfills its designed purposes and objectives, is a
difficult job which calls for a high degree of talent and for alert, dili-
gent effort."57 The courts of Tennessee, taking their cue from the
legislative mandate - the command of liberal construction - continue
in the vanguard of the majority of state courts in giving a liberal con-
struction to the Compensation Act, thus insuring that it fulfills its de-
signed humane purposes and objectives.
53. Flatt v. Tennessee Handle Co., 190 Tenn. 190, 228 S.W.2d 110 (1950).
54. Lucey Boiler & Mfg. Corp. v. Hicks, 188 Tenn. 700, 222 S.W.2d 19 (1949);
Swift & Co. v. Howard, 186 Tenn. 584, 212 S.W.2d 388 (1948).
55. Opinion by Prewitt, J., filed April 25, 1953.
56. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6877 (Williams Supp. 1952).
57. Zimmer, Introduction in HOROWiTZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Xiii
(1944).
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